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Abstract:
Defending  the  right  to  privacy  is  a  growing  concern  in  modern  society  as  surveillance,  as  a
formidable weapon in the “war on terror”, becomes more intrusive with every passing year. In order
to effectively defend the right to privacy one must know what privacy actually is. Privacy does not
have one universal definition, but is a concept that has evolved though varied socio-cultural and
historical circumstances, and is constantly being re-contextualised.
This paper aims to discuss and compare various conceptions of privacy, and the right to privacy,
with  a  focus  on  challenges  brought  about  by  technological  developments  and  surveillance.  In
addition it aims to analyse the implications of surveillance on the right to privacy, with a particular
emphasis on video surveillance. In order to reach these goals the paper compares and discusses
various  academic  conceptualisations  of  privacy,  and  analyses  the  discourse  surrounding  two
examples of video surveillance, CCTV coverage of London and the use of covert video surveillance
against Arne Treholt, a former bureau chief of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Many varied aspects of privacy are considered, with emphasis placed onto two distinct conceptions
of privacy; an inherent-value based conception which views privacy as a goal in itself, which is
necessary for full human development, and an exchange based conception which views privacy in
terms of an exchange, where personal data is disclosed in return for societal goods and benefits.
Privacy is  conceived  as  the control  of  one’s  own personal  data  at  the  most  basic  level,  while
surveillance is the process of recording private data; they are antagonistic contradictions.
Using  the  examples,  the  paper  attempts  to  reconcile  surveillance  with  privacy;  an  exchange
conception of privacy can accept derogations to the right to privacy in return for more security,
although only if  based  upon a  fair  exchange,  something the video surveillance  regimes  in  the
example likely do not provide.
The paper concludes with  some policy  recommendations regarding increased regulation and
transparency of surveillance.
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“They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary




The right to privacy is regarded as one of the fundamental human rights as set forth in article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and set forth as international law in article 17
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). The understanding of privacy
as a distinct right,  outwith the public domain, has evolved over  a long period of time and has
historically encompassed different  realms of human interaction and activity throughout different
time periods and cultures (Magi 2011, Kasper 2005). Even today the conception of privacy, and
congruently also what the right to privacy protects, is neither clear nor taken for granted, and is
constantly changing over time and in response to various developments and shifts of technology,
and national or international politics. 
The conception of privacy not only as an aspect of human life but as a human right, pinpoints the
importance  of  protecting  that  right  from  violations,  invasion  of  privacy  is  not  simply  an
inconvenience  but  an  important  human  rights  issue.  In  modern  society  there  are  daily  many
violations  of  the  right  to  privacy,  which  civil  rights  defenders  must  confront  and  take  into
consideration. This thesis aims to contribute to this field and discuss the implications of certain
violations  to  the  right  to  privacy.  Due  to  limitations  of  scope  this  thesis  will  delimit  its
investigations to the field of surveillance, specifically that of video surveillance. 
Surveillance is an increasingly debated topic, coming to the forefront over recent years due in part
to the “War on Terror” and the increasingly important role that surveillance plays in security since
the events of September the 11th 2001, and partly due to the development of more sophisticated and
integrated database and information gathering technology. In addition, many countries have recently
altered or added legislation lending increased scope to surveillance, both with regards to the amount
of surveillance available to security agencies and the intrusiveness of said surveillance in the post
9/11 era.
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Surveillance  is  in  a  perpetual  state  of  antagonistic  contradiction  to  the  right  to  privacy,  as  it
necessarily involves an invasion and violation of the right to privacy. But most commentators argue
that surveillance is necessary in many different aspects of societal life, be it health care, security
against crime or terrorism or even in order to improve customer service (references). Therefore the
extent to which surveillance is to be allowed or regulated in society is a current and important,
although often controversial, topic. This debate is further complicated by different understandings
and conceptualisations of what privacy is, and to what extent it is acceptable to derogate from the
right to privacy in exchange for other societal goods. 
As such the issue of surveillance and its effect on the right to privacy is an important and current
issue, which certainly warrants a deeper investigation. In order to achieve this, the thesis will look
at two different cases where video surveillance has been used for the benefit, or protection of public
security and what consequences this has for the privacy of the people under surveillance. It will also
analyse the media coverage of said surveillance to understand how people and the press react to,
and conceptualise such surveillance and the right to privacy in the given cases. The first case is the
use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) by the authorities in London, arguably one of the sites
under most surveillance in the world, to prevent crime and terrorism with particular focus given to
the post 9/11 period. The second is the covert video surveillance use against Arne Treholt during the
1980s by the Norwegian . This covert video surveillance was of his house as part of their evidence
gathering activities while he was under suspicion of treason. The use of covert video surveillance
was kept secret until it was finally revealed in September 2010 leading to cries of outrage from
Arne Treholt's wife of the time, Kari Storækre, who had also been monitored despite not being
under suspicion (Giertsen 2010). 
These  cases  are  appropriate  to  exemplify the  contentious  issues  at  hand as  they represent  two
separate current debates on the violation of the right to privacy, and the appropriate use of video
surveillance in the aid of security.  They are also examples of different  techniques; broad based
surveillance  on the  one  hand,  and covert,  targeted surveillance  on the  other.  In  both cases  the
surveillance  is  used  to  aid  the authorities  in  providing security and in  both cases  involves  the
surveillance  of  innocents  in  addition  to  the  suspects.  They  have  also  led  to  extensive  media
coverage of the cases in recent years. 
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1.2 The aim of the thesis:
The aim of this thesis is as follows:
To Discuss and compare different conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy, with a focus on
challenges brought about by developments in technology and surveillance.
To analyse the implications of surveillance for the right  to privacy,  particularly with regards to
video surveillance. 
1.3 Chapter overview:
The  following chapter  will  provide  a  brief  overview of  the  methodology used.  Chapter  3  will
present a discussion and comparison of different theoretical approaches to the concept of privacy.
This will then be followed by a general discussion on the concept of surveillance and its effects on
the right  to privacy.  Chapter  4 presents the two cases  of video surveillance in more detail  and
discusses  the  media  coverage  and  conceptualisations  of  the  right  to  privacy versus  security  in
regards  to  the cases.  In  Chapter  5  the cases  will  be discussed in  relation to  existing academic
conceptualisations and theories on privacy and surveillance. Finally Chapter 6 will conclude the




In order to achieve its goals this paper will primarily make use of two distinct methodologies; that
of a comparative perspective and that of critical discourse analysis. This chapter will discuss the
methodological approach used in this paper.
2.1. Discourse analysis as a theoretical context:
The research will use Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, not only as a method to reach its
goals,  but  also  as  a  theoretical  perspective  on  which  to  base  its  research  (Fairclough  2001).
Fairclough's perspective stems from the idea that language is an integral  and influential  part of
social life. Social life itself is composed of interconnected networks of various social practices such
as economic, political and cultural practices. These practices constitute a structure within which
there is “a relatively permanent way of acting socially” (Fairclough 2001:122), creating a domain of
social interaction which reproduces the existing social structures, while having the ability to alter
them.  Each social  practice is  comprised of several  different  elements,  such as social  relations,
social identities, cultural values and semiosis, a concept that includes “all forms of meaning making
– visual  images,  body language,  as well  as language” (Fairclough 2001:122).  All  of which are
related to each other dialectically, internalising aspects of the others while retaining their individual
properties.  Critical  discourse analysis  views semiosis as one of  the more significant  aspects  of
social interaction, and therefore focuses on it. In social practices semiosis is used as a tool but also
as contextualisation, as it is used to represent the practices both through social construction of other
practices, and through self-reflexive construction. In other words the terms used to define a social
practice that in turn helps shape the understanding of said practice (Fairclough 2001). Discourses
are the representations of social life, which are several diverse practices functioning together. When
discourses are networked together they produce a social order, which in turn constitutes a dominant
discourse (Fairclough 2001).
Discourses, dominant or not, colour people’s conceptions of reality through their use of language,
and through the analysis of language one can understand one's reality; how and why it changes in
given  circumstances.  This  research  is  operating  on  the  assumption  that  the  definitions  and
conceptions of different terms are not constant but are in fact fluid and changing, such as the term
privacy.  The paper  is  based on a theoretical  perspective where the use of language defines our
understanding of society and reality.
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2.2. Discourse analysis methodology:
The research will attempt to analyse and reflect over the social problem of derogations to the right
of  privacy caused by surveillance,  in particular,  video surveillance.  Particular  emphasis will  be
placed upon discourses, which emphasise the link between security-based surveillance and the right
to privacy, especially in relation to the “war against terror”. 
In order to analyse this issue of security-based derogations of the right to privacy, and identify the
obstacles to said right, the research will use relevant academic and non-academic texts to analyse
the major violations and concerns within the discourse. The research will not analyse the entire
semiosis of the social order as described by Fairclough (2001), but due to scope will instead focus
on the language aspects. That is; how language is used to shape the discourse and rank the aspects
that are important to the different actors, and in what specific ways the language is used in relation
to the issue.
To this end the research will first discuss the academic and theoretical literature on surveillance and
the  right  to  privacy,  in  search  of  various  conceptualisations  of  the  concepts  “privacy”  and
“surveillance”. This will enable the research to extrapolate some common issues and concerns over
the violation of the right  to privacy by surveillance. Note that this research is operating on the
assumption  that  definitions  and  conceptualisations  of  important  terms  are  neither  constant  nor
universal,  but  change  and  evolve  over  time.  Therefore  it  is  not  unlikely to  find  contradicting
conceptions of the same idea. Since these conceptualisations inform our perceptions of reality, it is
important to be aware of them. 
In addition to analysing academic texts, the research will analyse modern media coverage of two
examples of video surveillance. They will be analysed for their use of certain keyword expressions
and how they relate to the discourse.  From this data,  it  should be possible to determine which
definitions and conceptions of the right to privacy, and surveillance, are used by the various actors
in the debate. Some examples of these keywords are “security”, “privacy”, “protection”, “fear” and
“civil liberty”. The research will investigate the occurrence of these and similar keywords, not only
for their quantitative use but also for their qualitative properties, to discern if the framing of the
terms,  and  thereby their  meanings  change depending on  the actors  involved,  their  goals  or  on
external  events such as 9/11, and if  so, how this can take place.  Specifically it  will attempt to
analyse  how  these  keywords  and  terms  dialectically  are  shaped  by,  and  shape,  the  various
conceptions of privacy and surveillance. 
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Step 3 of Fairclough's (2001:125) critical discourse analysis urges the researcher to consider if the
social order or network of social practices needs the social problem to survive, the social problem in
this paper is of course violations of the right to privacy caused by surveillance. While step 4 urges
the researcher to suggest solutions to the social problem. This stems from Fairclough's assertion that
critical discourse analysis is not purely a method for analysing society, but a theory that plays “an
advocatory role” (Meyer 2001: 15), something that falls well within the proposed scope of this
paper. As such the issues brought up in Fairclough's step 3 and 4 shall be discussed in chapter 6.
2.3. Comparative perspective:
This  research paper will use a comparative perspective on two separate instances; the first of these
being  the  theoretical  discussion  of  previously existing  conceptions  of  the  right  to  privacy and
surveillance within academic literature. By comparing the different conceptions, the research will
be able to illustrate the subjective and evolving nature of the right to privacy, and highlight basic
understanding of surveillance and how this is perceived in light of the unique challenges posed by
the “war on terror”. The second instance is a discussion on two separate illustrative examples, in
which video surveillance has been used in order to promote public security and safety.  In  each
example the research will  discuss  the media discourse surrounding the  intrusive aspects of  the
surveillance and the concept of privacy. These will then be compared and contrasted to each other in
order to determine which concerns and issues are common in relation to the right to privacy and
surveillance, which are more contentious, and which are lent most weight. Finally the research will
compare  the  arguments  and  issues  surrounding  the  examples  of  video  surveillance,  with  the
previously established theoretical conceptions and issues, in order to extrapolate the implications of
modern video surveillance on the right to privacy. 
As such it is important to choose useful and meaningful examples and instances for comparison,
there must be solid reasoning behind the choice and the comparison must be able to add something
to the research. In order to reach such goals the research needs to determine several points to be
used in comparison; the examples need to be similar enough to enable a proper comparison, while
dissimilar enough that comparison provides fruitful insights into the issues at hand. In addition there
will be a limitation of scope, as there are far too many aspects that could be investigated; such as
electronic interception, full body scanners at airports, covert video surveillance or CCTV cameras
on the streets or public transport. This research will be focused primarily on a specific aspect of
surveillance. It is important to note that despite this, the research will still discuss the theoretical
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aspects of several varying types of surveillance due to their interconnected nature. 
The research  will  also  attempt  to  compare  the  qualitative  aspects  of  surveillance,  focusing  on
technological advancements such as so called “data mining”, or face recognition technology, which
is replacing human monitoring of surveillance data with computer monitoring, in effect becoming
more invasive and comprehensive (Galison and Minow 2006). The research will compare the use of
such  measures  both  between  countries  and  between  variants  of  video  surveillance,  in  order  to
attempt to determine if there has been a qualitative increase in the intrusiveness of surveillance.
Comparing  data  from  two  separate  countries  and  conducting  a  cross-cultural  comparison  is
advantageous  to  the  research,  as  one  can  more  easily  confirm  the  general  applicability  of  the
theories and results reached, if there are similar trends and outcomes visible in both countries. This
cross-country comparison could also be applied to the discussion on the concerns and issues that
surround the concept of the right to privacy, and that of surveillance, in addition to the obstacles to
promoting civil liberty. 
2.4 Scope and limitations of comparison:
Due to limitations of scope, the research will focus on one aspect of surveillance in particular, that
of video surveillance. This has been chosen both because of the the controversial nature of such
surveillance, and the fact that video surveillance has been used extensively in fighting crime and
terrorism for  many years  and  in  many countries;  for  example,  the  current  CCTV surveillance
regime in the UK has been in operation since 1998, (Gill and Spriggs 2005). It is also an important
part of modern counter-terror policies, thus making it useful for discussing the effects of the war on
terror on the right to privacy (BBC 2010, 20/07). 
The paper will limit the comparison of examples to two distinct instances; using CCTV coverage in
London as one of the examples, and the covert video surveillance of Arne Treholt in the 1980s by
Norwegian security police as the other. It will pay particular attention to the subsequent debate that
erupted in the Norwegian media in 2010, after the covert surveillance became publicly known.
These examples were chosen due to their similarities and distinct differences. Both examples use
video  surveillance  in  order  to  maintain  and  protect  national  security;  both  countries’  video
surveillance practices are controversial,  sparking heated debates. These debates both discuss the
issue of surveillance of “innocent” members of the public alongside the suspects. The scale of the
surveillance  is  quite  different  however,  UK CCTV is  a  broad  based  surveillance  that  watches
practically everyone who passes through London, while the Treholt example is a targeted covert
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surveillance  operation.  The  research  proposes  that  the  comparison  of  the  UK and  Norway,  is
beneficial to the research as they are countries with similar western and yet distinct cultures which
have  historically  cooperated  in  security  matters,  through  NATO,  and  faced  the  same  apparent
problems  of  balancing  security  and  civil  liberties.  This  cross-cultural  comparison  will  aid  in
reducing the risk of drawing conclusions that  appear to be general,  but are in reality culturally
contextual  (Bryman  2008).  The  research  has  chosen  not  be  compare  other  countries’  video
surveillance due to limitations of space, comparing more examples would lead to overly diluted
research. 
The results of these comparisons will finally be used to determine what effects the “war on terror”
has had on the right of privacy, i.e. whether the concept of privacy has altered in such a way as to
encompass  less  of  an  individual's  life,  or  if  the  concerns  of  national  security  have  led  to  an
acceptance of increased derogations of the right to privacy. 
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3. Theoretical background of privacy and surveillance:
3.1. Conceptualisation of Privacy:
Included in the UDHR at its adoption in 1948, is the right to privacy, a right later enshrined in
international law as article 17 of the CCPR. The conception of privacy as a right, which requires
protection  from  violations,  is  an  important  development  in  human  rights  history.  But  the
understanding of the definition and meaning of privacy has varied over time and place (Magi 2011,
Rosen  2000,  Posner  2008).  The  following  section  will  give  a  brief  overview  of  the  major
conceptions of privacy. 
The concept of privacy as an individual right was arguably first discussed as a legal issue in the 18th
century with private property forming the basis of the right, as exemplified by the US constitution
(Rosen 2000). This concept has since then evolved due to technological challenges and changing
perspectives on human psychology, rights and philosophy (Magi 2011). One of the first defences of
privacy, in the face of its vulnerability to technological change, came in the 1890 article by Louis D.
Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren. In this article they discussed the threat posed by the technological
advancements in “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise” (quoted in Rosen 2000:
34), which could erode the right to privacy, conceptualised by them as the right “to be let alone”
(Quoted in Magi 2011: 189). Such debates over the effects and threats of technology to the right to
privacy have only increased in intensity since the seminal 1890 article, gaining further weight with
the advent of  the “information age”,  in which our daily lives involve constant  interaction with
computers  and computerised databases.  Modern technology has made it  possible to collect  and
analyse enough data to “amount to a picture of your life so complete it's equivalent to somebody
following you around all day with a video camera” (Baer quoted in Galison and Minow 2006: 263). 
The existing literature  on privacy is  considerable and  broad in  scope,  covering many different
academic fields and focusing on many varied aspects and violations of privacy. There is a spirited
debate on how this right may have derived from the other pre-existing rights, such as the right of
ownership and the right not to be harmed, or as a unique right inherent to the human condition,
(Magi 2011). This paper understands the right to privacy to be a fundamental human right, which
has value in and of itself but is also closely linked to other human rights, and acts to a certain extent
as an enabling right. 
Part of the reason why privacy is such a debated concept stems from the fact that it  is “both a
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normative and a descriptive notion” (Manning 1997: 820). As such it is quite clear that there is no
universal definition of privacy, instead different conceptions emphasise different aspects of human
life  as  private,  meaning that  a  violation of  the  right  to  privacy within one definition could be
perfectly acceptable in another, depending on how the right is derived (Introna and Pouloudi 1999,
Magi 2011). In addition to different academic interpretations of privacy, there is also a documented
socio-historic variation of the concept of privacy, which further confuses attempts at defining it. For
example, rules limiting entry to houses or to what extent it is acceptable to touch other individuals,
vary  from  country  to  country.  Despite  the  different  cultural  conceptions,  all  cultures  have  an
inherent need for a modicum of individual and group privacy and the norms necessary are present in
all cultures, although the norms themselves do vary (Kasper 2005, Magi 2011).
While many theorists attempt to reduce privacy to a single concept, other theorists argue that in
today's  complex  society  such  simple  definitions  are  too  vague  to  be  of  use,  or  are  not
comprehensive enough to be applicable or easily defended (Magi 2011). Conceptions of privacy
that  are  too  vague hamper  the  defence of  privacy,  as  courts  and policy makers  “cannot  easily
articulate the privacy harm” that must be protected against.
Some modern privacy debates have sought instead to outline various distinct aspects of privacy and
important similarities, which can then combine as an interlinked whole with privacy as a “shorthand
umbrella term for a related web of issues” (Magi 2011: 190). Manning (1997), for example, points
out that many a liberal commentator's definition of the right to privacy can be broadly split into two
major  categories  of  violations;  violations  of  the  right  to  liberty,  and  restrictions  on a  person’s
development. Interestingly this mimics the debate on how the right to privacy is derived. In the
former category privacy is simply a derivative of the more important right to liberty while in the
second category the right to privacy has a value in itself as part of a person’s development. 
Some theorists point out how important privacy is in relation to personal development, maturity and
interpersonal relations. To be able to form individual opinions and thought, it is necessary to be able
to  withdraw  from  the  public  sphere  to  reflect;  without  some  modicum  of  privacy  to  reflect
individually,  society would be entirely homogeneous (Magi  2011).  Rosen (2000) argues that  in
order to create an intimate relationship an individual must be able to gradually and privately reveal
their thoughts and feelings, something that would be impossible without a protected private sphere.
While traditional privacy conceptions were based upon a physical conception of one's home and
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property, such definitions cannot account for the issues raised through the technological advances of
the information age. Instead many theorists emphasise that privacy does not solely relate to the
physical aspects or the development of a person, but includes the right to control one’s personal
data; who has access to it and to what ends it may be used (Rosen 2000, Posner 2008, Introna and
Pouloudi 1999). Posner emphasises the aspect of secrecy in relation to personal information. As
such he distinguishes between a person’s “pure” interest in secrecy and their “instrumental” interest.
That is; they fear that the information could be used against them and wish to protect themselves
from it. For example a person may not wish to be photographed naked from a pure perspective or
may wish to avoid blackmail from an instrumental perspective (Posner 2008: 245). This secrecy is
not  limited  to  personal  information  but  includes  protected  communications.  Rosen  claims  that
simply terming privacy as secrecy is an oversimplification, as the concept of privacy includes “the
ability to control the conditions under which personal information is disclosed to others (Rosen
2000: 36). Although Posner does not explicitly state that such control falls under the concept of
Privacy. His discussion of voluntary disclosure of personal information in order to receive a credit
card, driver’s license or similar benefits as an issue of privacy, implies that he is in agreement. He
further  argues  that  although  individuals  do  care  about  personal  secrecy,  they  willingly  share
personal information “at the drop of a hat” creating an odd dialectic between personal benefit and
privacy (Posner 2008: 251). It is important to note that Posner’s emphasis on instrumental secrecy
as a form of concealment has been challenged as presupposing a common and universal value base
(Introna and Pouloudi 1999). 
Ashworth and Free (2006) focus on online privacy, and describe privacy as an exchange between
consumers who freely disclose their personal information in exchange for goods or benefits from
firms, although one could apply such a concept to different actors within society, such as between
an individual and the government. An example of such an exchange would be giving one’s name
and address in exchange for the use of an email address, or the opening of a bank account. This
exchange theory can complement Posner's conception of voluntary information disclosure and vice
versa. 
Introna and Pouloudi (1999) argue that since privacy is socially and culturally defined we cannot
find any single example of something that is considered private in all cultures.  Instead we must
focus on a common feature of all privacy conceptions; that individuals wish to retain and protect
certain aspects of, or information on themselves from the judgement of others. This conception of
privacy stems from a form of pluralist  understanding of human society where each individual's
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values are unique and varied, requiring private control of the de- and re-contextualisation of the
data, something that is denied without a private sphere. They claim that privacy has an intrinsic
value to individuals by enabling their individual values to develop, and reject claims that there are
self-evident universally accepted values (Introna and Pouloudi 1999). They point out that data taken
out  of  context  by  invasions  of  privacy  or  the  re-purposing  of  existing  data,  can  lead  to
“inappropriate judgement of others” (Introna and Pouloudi 1999: 30). 
Prosser  uses  four  types  of  legal  issues  that  threaten the right  to privacy,  on which to base his
conception.  These  include;  intrusions  upon  an  individual’s  solitude  and  private  affairs,  public
disclosure of personal facts, publicity placing an individual in a false light and the appropriation of
an individuals likeness or identity (Magi 2011). Solove claims this is too rigid and instead raises six
distinct but interrelated categories of privacy definitions. His categories include: “(1) the right to be
let alone, (2) the ability to limit access to the self by others, (3) secrecy or concealment of certain
matters, (4) the ability to control information about oneself, (5) the protection of one's personhood,
individuality  and  dignity  and,  (6)  control  over  one's  intimate  relationships  or  aspects  of  life.”
(quoted in Magi 2011: 189). 
Due to the diverse nature of the existing conceptions of the right to privacy, which appears to be
much more than simply the right to “be let alone”, and instead encompasses and touches upon many
different aspects of individual life and societal activities, it is most beneficial to base an analysis of
privacy under a broad umbrella conception from which one can dialectically define privacy by
relating the violations of, and intrusions on the right to privacy, to the different aspects of such a
complex right.
3.2.Overview of issues concerning privacy.
Due to privacy's essential role in human society and development, it is especially important to
identify and analyse the potential threats and issues that may occur in society. Due to the varied
nature of privacy conceptualisations, the issues facing it are diverse and many-faceted. 
It can be derived from the notion of “the right to be let alone” that individuals must be allowed the
freedom to create private spaces, both mental and physical, in which they can form independent and
unique thoughts and opinions, form intimate relations and be able to relax away from the pressures
of public life. It is also important to be able to drop the “mask” or role, which they use in public
settings (Magi 2011, Rosen 2000). If individual privacy is eroded within a society it is possible that
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one may find a decrease in new and independent thoughts among the population. The information
age has also facilitated an exponential increase in available information, which some theorists argue
has  led  to  a  condition  of  reduced  attention  spans  among  society's  individuals,  meaning  the
interpretation of information has been reduced to simply processing sound-bytes. This can lead to
more information being taken out of context or misinterpreted (Rosen 2000, Magi 2011). 
It is also important to note that an encroachment of the right to privacy could have negative effects
on freedom of expression, as the speech and actions of the individual naturally alter if the individual
knows he or she is under third party scrutiny, they become more guarded and less spontaneous
(Rosen 2000). One could argue, based on this, that surveillance may lead to a more forced and
unnatural social interaction in society. It could be argued that the above issues are various forms of
“pure” concern for privacy.
The  development  of  information  technology and  the  possibilities  it  provides  for  handling  and
retaining  personal  information,  has  led  to  one  of  the  more  complicated  privacy  issues  facing
modern society. Modern databases of personal data are used in a variety of fields, from medicine to
travel and financial records (Bayer and Fairchild 2000, Haggerty and Gazso 2005). In many cases,
such as that of name based surveillance in epidemiological studies, privacy concerns have become
more prominent in recent years, predominantly in response to the risk of social stigma should the
information gathered by surveillance be revealed. This reflects a growing concern about the use and
storage of personal data in modern databases  and can be regarded as  a  form of  “instrumental”
concern (Bayer and Fairchild 2000, Vleck 2008, Posner 2008). Some databases try to counter this
by pledging to keep the data secure and retain it only for the purpose stated, but such pledges are
not always believed or adhered to (Bayer and Fairchild 2000). In addition, as electronic data can be
more easily retained and accessed than earlier paper records, it is also more easily misappropriated
or re-purposed. A recent example is the hacking of PSN (PlayStation Network) (BBC 2011, 07/03). 
Given a conception of privacy in terms of exchange, Ashworth and Free (2006) point out two major
issues; (1) consumer awareness of information gathering, often consumers will be less concerned
about privacy if they are aware of the surveillance and have given permission for it. This is less a
contentious issue, rather a way for information gatherers to avoid privacy concerns. The focus here
is on a consumer agency releasing their control over their private information. (2) concerns over
how the data is used. In many cases information gathered under a particular pretence, such as email
addresses for an Internet service, can be sold to other companies for advertising purposes or can be
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misappropriated in order to commit fraud (Ashworth and Free 2006). 
Ashworth and Free (2006) use theories of justice and fairness judgements to address the concerns
regarding how fair an exchange is. They claim that individuals will look to both distributive justice
and procedural justice in order to judge their exchanges. Comparing the value of the information
disclosed  to  the  value  of  the  services  or  goods  gained,  will  provide  the  consumer  with  an
understanding  of  the  material  fairness  of  the  exchange.  In  the  procedural  justice aspect  of  the
judgement, consumers compare the method of the exchange to “normative standards of respectful
behaviour” (Ashworth and Free 2006: 115). In relation to information gathering these norms can be;
the expectation of a firm’s openness about what data is gathered and why, or whether permission is
requested beforehand. In  many ways the main concern is  the “possibility of negative outcomes
resulting from the exchange” (Ashworth  and Free  2006:  111).  With so much data  collected  in
today's databases it is increasingly difficult to regulate how this data is used. 
Rosen (2000) argues, using the US as an example, that people are becoming at once both more
concerned about privacy and also increasingly exhibitionist, primarily in regards to the Internet in
the form of blogs, webcasts and social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter. One could
explain this as a form of voluntary disclosure of information, which could be regarded as given in
exchange for fame or online social interaction.
This brief overview of issues concerning the right to privacy, shows that most violations appear to
fall into four broad categories. Physical violations of privacy; invasions of the home or person.
Intellectual violations; the erosion of an individual’s ability to form independent thought and have
his or her freedom of expression. Informational violations; the control of one's personal and private
information. And finally relational; the ability to form intimate personal relations.
It is interesting to note that most modern theorists focus on non-physical privacy issues, most likely
as a reaction to the challenges posed by developments in modern information technology, while
they appear to have taken physical privacy for granted and view it as uncontroversial. 
3.3. Surveillance and privacy:
Loss of privacy occurs when “others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him,
or gain access to him” (Gavison quoted in Introna and Pouloudi 1999: 29), as such, surveillance can
be conceived as the antithesis of privacy and yet surveillance is prominent in almost every aspect of
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society. In order to investigate this, one must first briefly investigate what surveillance is and how it
is used. 
Since  the  terrorist  attacks  on  September  the  11th 2001,  several  countries  have  constructed  “an
intensive surveillance structure” as a major aspect of their counter-terror policies (Haggerty and
Gozso  2005:  170).  The surveillance  employed  by said  policies  includes,  but  is  not  limited  to,
“sensors, bureaucratic documentation, x-rays, satellites, and computerized databases”. Surveillance
is not limited to purely security usage but is utilised by a myriad of actors including private firms
and non-security government  agencies.  The purposes  of  such surveillance are  as  diverse  as  its
methods, encompassing among others; improved governance, profit maximisation, entertainment,
health services and security (Haggerty and Gozso 2005, Bayer and Fairchild 2000). The focus of
this thesis will be on CCTV surveillance as an aspect of security policies, although a discussion of
other surveillance techniques is necessary as modern surveillance is often an interconnected system.
Despite a number of commentators emphasising surveillance as an aspect of the war on terror, many
of the techniques used are in fact developments of older surveillance practices, such as financial
surveillance used in the war on drugs. What has changed in the post 9/11 era, is the scope and
intensity, surveillance is now a much larger focus of security policies and more apparent in society
(Vlcek 2008). 
Posner (2008) illustrates that private communications are valuable, as much to innocent civilians as
to criminals and terrorists, and that a broad-based surveillance of communications or public spaces
would lead to criminals and terrorists having their communications or public activities curtailed.
This is an important goal for security policy and he argues that surveillance, in coordination with
modern data collection and analysis, is an important tool in the fight against terror. For example
data mining, that  is  software which picks out certain aspects within the data such as particular
words  within  communications  or  irregular  travelling  patterns,  enables  security  agencies  to  sort
through the frankly enormous piles of data that surveillance can create, in order to identify only the
cases  that  interest  the  surveillance  operators.  This  can  be  applied  to  both  the  monitoring  of
communications and travel records, or as an analysis of CCTV data.
A side effect of similar broad surveillance techniques, which target entire populations, could be a
reduction of the free idea exchange among the innocents who are aware they are under surveillance.
Posner (2008) claims that this is a small cost in relation to the resultant effects on security. Vlcek
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(2008) argues that the increased scope and intensity of surveillance measures is in fact counter-
productive to security concerns, as the sheer amount of data only further conceals terrorist activities.
He points out that while data mining technology can aid security operatives in sifting through the
data, it also creates far too many “false positives”. That is a data positive, flagged as suspicious by
the software, which upon further investigation turns out to be false. This would lead to an increased
violation  of  the  innocent  individual's  right  to  privacy,  as  security  operatives  investigate  them
without gaining any benefit in security terms. Instead Vleck argues that surveillance could be based
upon individual cases where suspicion already exists, something Posner rejects. Warrant based or
similar surveillance, which can only target people already under suspicion, cannot find unknown
criminals or terrorists. He agrees that while broad based surveillance can cause “false positives” it is
infinitely preferable  to any “false negatives” that  warrant  based surveillance could cause.  Thus
restricting  the  surveillance  to  the  extent  it  cannot  find  hidden  terrorists  and  terrorist  plots,  as
happened in the run up to 9/11. (Posner 2008)
There is an often Hobbesian reasoning behind modern day state surveillance; people will accept
certain derogations of their right to privacy by the “state leviathan” in exchange for the protection it
can offer (Vlcek 2008: 23). One can argue that it is part of the social contract between the state and
the people or  that  it  is  a  conscious exchange of individual privacy for  increased security.  This
conception of  the right  to  privacy as  an antagonistic  contradiction to security,  and terming the
balance between the two as an exchange, is common among many commentators on surveillance
and security. As such the debate is often focused on how much privacy we can actually afford to
give up in the name of security, and rather less on whether we need to give up privacy (Posner
2008, Bayer and Fairchild 2000, Haggerty and Gozso 2005).
A major aspect of modern surveillance is the process of previously disparate databases becoming
increasingly interconnected  due  to  digitalisation,  previously innocuous  information  can  now be
combined into a rather complete picture of a persons life (Posner 2008, Introna and Pouloudi 1999).
Haggerty and Gozso (2005: 172) define this as a “surveillant assemblage”, which is characterised
not as a single system but as a  potentiality. The assemblage consists of a decentralised group of
distinct databases, which can potentially be combined into a centralised search. State actors often
incorporate this assemblage in their surveillance operations, to take advantage of the “surveillance
and informational  capacities  of  ostensibly non-state  organisations”  (Haggerty and  Gozso  2005:
174). This is a growing trend where many non-state or police actors are being urged to or legally
required  to  increase  surveillance,  for  example  bank  tellers  becoming in  effect  “little  brothers”
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(Vlcek  2008).  Another  concern  raised  by  the  use  of  modern  databases  is  the  fact  that  such
information  can  be  retained  almost  indefinitely  (Monmonier  2002),  there  is  a  threat  that  data
collected for a given purpose is retained and available long after it has served it's initial purpose.
Since not only the data is retained but the surveillance regimes themselves, once implemented, are
difficult to remove, the issue that “surveillance regimes instituted and justified for one purpose now
rapidly assume other uses” (Haggerty and Gozso 2005: 170) is quickly pressing to the forefront of
the debate. Vlcek (2008) points out that some surveillance originally created to combat terrorism
has since been used against “garden-variety” crime, highlighting the possible negative ramifications
of implementing an extensive and invasive surveillance regime. Posner (2008) explains that trust is
an important aspect for successful surveillance regimes, and can counter privacy concerns. If the
public trust the security agencies to be professional and impartial with the data, including in what
way  the  data  is  used  and  that  it  will  not  find  its  way  into  other  databases  or  be  otherwise
misappropriated, then they would be more likely to accept intrusive surveillance. It is similar to
people being willing to disrobe in front of a doctor, as they believe that a doctor’s interest is purely
professional. It  is important to note that such reasoning only addresses individual’s instrumental
interests in privacy, but cannot satisfy their pure concerns. 
A similar instrumental justification for broad-based surveillance is that invasions of privacy should
not be of concern to the general law abiding public and should only be of concern to criminals and
terrorists. It can be argued however, that this is based on a basic conception of privacy as the right
to be “let alone” and as such does not take into account any inherent values of privacy that can be
found in other conceptions of privacy (Vlcek 2008).
An interesting aspect of surveillance is that it can, in some cases, be self-replicating, CCTV is a
good example; if a certain neighbourhood has a high CCTV camera coverage then residents in other
surrounding neighbourhoods often feel less secure and call for CCTV coverage of their own area.
Haggerty and Gozso (2005) claim that this would not necessarily help security but simply displace
crime and terror threats. It is also unlikely to lead to an, in their opinion, re-evaluation of how we
understand surveillance, but simply lead to calls for more surveillance.
There is  a  general  acceptance of  the necessity of  surveillance in  modern society and there  are
several different approaches that attempt to reconcile surveillance with the right to privacy. These
approaches  are  then  employed  as  a  measuring  stick  or  filter  when  discussing  how  and  when
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surveillance  can  be  used.  The argument  that  surveillance  should  only be  a concern  if  one  has
something  to  hide,  justifies  surveillance  in  terms  of  the  benefits  it  brings  to  society,  and  a
conception of privacy as non-interference.  CCTV, for example, intrudes on personal interactions
and can be used to compile data about an individual’s location and their habits, information that is
necessary for  observers  to  piece  together  a  meaningful  picture  (Monmonier  2002).  The  above
conception would argue that this does not pose a problem to the right to privacy per se, but the
conception rejects notions of the inherent value of privacy and it's necessity to human development.
In effect it does not consider broad surveillance such as CCTV coverage, which can be so complete
that it is in essence impossible to function in modern society and avoid being under surveillance, as
violating  the  right  to  privacy  (Vlcek  2008,  Posner  2008).  Other  commentators  argue  that
surveillance inherently reduces an individual's worth, changing them into objects, not people. The
knowledge that we are under surveillance changes the way we act and takes away our personal
spaces in which we can form private thoughts and opinions (Ashworth and Free 2006).
Ashworth and Free's  (2006) approach to surveillance and privacy uses the conceptualisation of
privacy as a good that can be exchanged in return for societal goods or benefits, such as increased
security. This conception would allow derogations of the right to privacy as one end of an exchange.
Their conception provides a format in which one can analyse the costs and benefits of such an
exchange through fairness judgements. This is only applicable in cases where the judgements are
made  in  situations  where  access  to  the  relevant  information  is  available  and  trustworthy.  The
consumers, the populace who will be under surveillance, must know to what ends their personal
data  will  be used  and be  able  to  trust  it  will  not  be  re-purposed.  Data  aggregation is  quickly
becoming a growing threat by collecting innocuous data and compiling it for purposes other than
those originally intended (Magi 2011). 
The focus of such an exchange is on an individual level and presupposes a degree of agency. Can it
truly be said that every individual in society has agreed to an exchange of personal information, in
return for increased security with regards to broad based surveillance? CCTV coverage can be so
comprehensive that it is essentially impossible to avoid while participating in modern society, thus
representing an involuntary surveillance (Posner 2008). One could argue that individuals who have
not voluntarily agreed to the surveillance are in fact having their right to privacy violated. It  is
difficult  to justify covert  surveillance in terms of an the exchange approach, since the inherent
secrecy of covert surveillance implies that the individuals involved are not aware of their disclosure
of personal data and as such have not agreed to the exchange, no matter what benefits they receive.
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Ashworth and Free (2006) point to the secret selling or transfer, for other purposes, of data given in
a  particular  setting,  as  one  of  the  major  barriers  to  fair  exchange  judgements.  Social  contract
theorists may argue that the acceptance of any derogations or violations of the right to privacy, was
implicit in a member’s participation in society, but such reasoning is valid only together with an
acceptance of social contract theory. 
Many commentators, who accept that a certain amount of derogation of the right to privacy must
take place in order to increase security, are in disagreement over how much focus should be put on
security. An important aspect of surveillance regimes is that the mechanics are difficult to remove
once in place. If the immediate terror threat and the fear it brings, which causes populations to place
more weight on security than privacy, passes, it may no longer be necessary but may still exist. This
is equally applicable to data, since modern information technology can retain data more or less
indefinitely (Vlcek 2008,  Haggerty and Gozso 2005).  Repurposing of  surveillance regimes and
databases is certainly one of the greatest privacy concerns in modern society. The question then
becomes “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” or “who guards the guardians” perhaps better understood
as “who guards us from the guardians” (Vlcek 2008: 23). 
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4. Illustrative examples of video surveillance:
This  chapter  will  give  a  brief  overview  of  two  examples  where  video  surveillance  has  been
implemented  in  order  to  strengthen  national  security;  the  first  instance  is  the  usage  of  CCTV
cameras by council or police authorities in London, the second instance is the usage of covert video
surveillance in the Arne Treholt case by Norwegian PST (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, or the Police
Security Service1). Following each overview, the chapter will continue with a discourse analysis of
some of the media coverage surrounding the examples, focusing primarily on the conceptualisations
of surveillance and the right  to privacy used by the concerned actors.  It  will  also consider  the
question of how the surveillance is justified in each example. 
4.1. CCTV coverage in London:
The UK citizens are often referred to as one of the world’s most watched, and London as its most
observed city where there are more CCTV cameras per capita than anywhere else in the world, with
figures as high as one camera “for every 14 citizens” (David Davis quoted on BBC 2008, 12/06).
London is thought to have more than 7000 operative CCTV cameras in total, while the borough of
Wandsworth  alone  has  over  1000  cameras,  the  latter  representing  more  CCTV coverage  than
Dublin, San Francisco, Johannesburg and Boston combined (BBC 2009, 20/07). CCTV coverage
has,  since the 1960s,  become a major aspect  of UK counter-terror policies,  especially after the
London bombings on the 7th of July 2005. The number of cameras in use continues to mount as
police and councils rely more and more on video surveillance (BBC 2010, 11/05). 
CCTV coverage can be said to have two different, but interlinked purposes; that of fighting terror,
and that of fighting crime, and has a history of both since the 1960s (BBC 2006, 3/11). Although
there are many instances where CCTV has been instrumental in solving or preventing crime, other
statistics have led to increased concerns over the effectiveness of CCTV. Statistics such as ”Fewer
than one crime in 30 is  solved through CCTV” (McSmith 2008) or  ”1,000 cameras  solve one
crime'” (BBC 2009, 24/08) have added to the anti-CCTV debate. Concerns over what other possible
purposes are served by CCTV coverage are strengthened by cases of city councils using CCTV to
monitor parking violations or firms allowing private persons access to CCTV coverage of public
areas, have added another dimension to the debate (BBC 2011, 20/01, Allen 2006). 
1 Known as POT at the time of his arrest.
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4.2. Discourse analysis regarding CCTV coverage in London:
There is a huge amount of media interest regarding the use of CCTV in London, within which one
can  find  a  varied  berth  of  perspectives  ranging  from  journalistic  reports  on  the  statistical
implications  of CCTV surveillance,  to  quotes  from politicians  and privacy activists,  to  opinion
columnists. The discourse is split between those in favour of a more comprehensive CCTV system
and those that  oppose it,  each side of the discourse have their own arguments and language to
convey their messages. The paper will present and discuss these arguments and its language. 
Proponents of  a  comprehensive CCTV surveillance system often use arguments focused on the
benefits of surveillance, generally in regards to security or safety. Both politicians and the general
media remark upon how CCTV coverage has played a prominent role against terrorist threats in
London, especially when discussing the role it played in the investigation of the London bombings
of  2005.  (BBC 2010,  11/05).  Karl  Powell,  a  Westminster  city  council  member,  explained  that
increased CCTV capacity, while not the ultimate solution to crime and terror, was “a very powerful
tool which we are able to link to our other anti-crime initiatives.” (BBC 2002 18/09). However it is
not only policy makers who discuss privacy and surveillance in terms of security or safety, many
local  residents  are  also  in  favour  of  video  surveillance.  In  Shoreditch,  for  example,  a  novel
programme  has  been  initiated,  where  CCTV cameras  are  connected  directly  to  the  television
channels of local residents, in order for them to monitor their neighbourhood and alert the police if
they observe anything suspicious. Local residents have been quoted as saying that CCTV; “will
mean they feel  a lot safer” (Allen 2006).  Privacy campaigners have condemned such moves as
promoting fear  and suspicion in  society,  and have raised concerns  regarding vigilantism (BBC
2006, 10/01, 2009, 18/11).
Hari (2008) argues in favour of the use of CCTV surveillance in a similar form to that of those
focused on protecting the right to privacy from intrusion, by focusing on the human rights aspects
of the discourse. She points out how the individual liberty of the person can be protected by CCTV
surveillance, that by protecting the security and safety of an individual their liberty is preserved and
their other rights enabled. This is a notable deviation from most language used in defence of a
comprehensive CCTV surveillance regime. She goes on to discuss how anti-CCTV proponents use
“bombastic”  language  to  paint  CCTV as  a  totalitarian  threat  to  society,  claiming  that  that  is
unreasonably diverting  the  discourse  away from the  more  important  issues  of  how to  balance
privacy with security. In addition she points out that the cameras are in any case monitoring public
spaces and therefore cannot intrude on privacy. 
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Many privacy defenders, particularly columnists and campaigners, use the term “Orwellian” about
the surveillance regime, and compare the state to “Big Brother” from Orwell's  dystopian novel
when discussing privacy concerns and CCTV surveillance. Of course the use of “Orwellian” does
not refer only to video surveillance but it is one of the more prominent aspects of the novel. The use
of  the term does  not  appear  to  imply that  the commentators  view London and the UK CCTV
surveillance  regime  as  totalitarian,  more that  it  has  the  potential  to  become so.  This  type  of
terminology is particularly common in connection with texts discussing increase in surveillance or
articles about its ineffectiveness (Goodchild 2007, Walsh 2010, Duffy 1999, BBC 2009, 6/02). 
Such terminology is often found when privacy campaigners are questioning whether the benefits of
CCTV outweigh the concerns that arise when the surveillance is re-purposed, from its major goals
of “security and safety”,  to  be used instead in combating minor infringements such as parking
infringements or dog fouling. The campaigners often paint such re-appropriation of CCTV data in
negative terms; such as “policing by remote control” and CCTV or surveillance “creep”, describing
how video surveillance is spreading into more areas than originally conceived (BBC 2009, 06/02,
2011,  20/01).  Terming CCTV as  remote  control  policing evokes images of  machines  replacing
human interaction, while the idea of CCTV creeping make it seem like an underhand development.
Others however view the spread of CCTV surveillance to other fields as a positive development,
claiming it will help combat minor infractions, and that most people are reassured by the presence
of more CCTV (BBC 2011, 20/01).
Similar emotive language is most common when used by privacy rights campaigners rather than
CCTV surveillance defenders, as in expressions such as the UK “committing slow social suicide”
through unwittingly allowing such a steady increase in surveillance (Goodchild 2007). This kind of
language in particular,  mimics concerns by privacy rights theorists  who are concerned with the
inherent values of privacy. CCTV proponents do of course use emotive language, although it rarely
paints such a sombre picture as the above. Instead it is generally focused on the need for security
and the abolition of citizen’s fear. But it is worth noting that both proponents for and against CCTV,
use arguments based upon fear,  in the discourse.  Privacy proponents often ascribe requests  for
extended CCTV surveillance by local residents to a “culture of fear and mistrust driven by a failure
on the part of the borough and the police to have proper law enforcement” in the area (Alex Deane
quoted in BBC 2009, 18/11). It must be noted that this development is not universally lauded by
policy makers and advisers; The Department for Communities and Local Government had asked
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councils  to  ensure  their  video  surveillance  was  “proportionately”  used,  the  overuse  on  minor
infractions could lead to a loss of trust in CCTV surveillance (BBC 2009, 06/02).
The discourse touches upon the issue of CCTV effectiveness, a particularly complicated issue as
there are no conclusive studies of the CCTV's effect on crime rates; the estimates vary from a 95
percent reduction in crime, to solving only 1 in every 1000 crimes (McSmith 2008, BBC 2009,
24/08). There are however two general trends within the discourse; that of promoting CCTV as a
valuable tool for the protection of citizens from crime or  terror,  and that  of deriding CCTV as
expensive, infective and poorly operated. Police officials have conceded that CCTV operation is not
optimal and ought to be improved. But, as opposed to privacy campaigners, they argue that putting
more resources into CCTV training and equipment to optimise surveillance is a better option (BBC
2009, 24/08, McSmith 2008). The language used in positive reports on CCTV refers often to the
professional and scientific usage of the surveillance regime, and that there is a strong commitment
to investing in a functioning surveillance operation. There is also a strong focus in these articles
stressing that crime has in fact been reduced (BBC 2010, 26/12). The Mayor of London, Boris
Johnson, exemplified this stating; “sustained investment in policing and CCTV - is helping us make
significant strides along the road of tackling crime in our city” (BBC 2010, 11/05).  
There is one certain similarity between the discussion of opinions on both sides of the discourse;
they almost always use lists of examples to strengthen their arguments, either by showing statistics
of ineffective CCTV coverage or examples where CCTV has indeed been effective (McSmith 2008,
BBC 2009, 24/08, Hari 2008). The debate can be quite heated with both sides of the discursive
divide using emotionally charged language, painting pictures of the need for security and safety, or
the risks of a bleak Orwellian future that surveillance represents.
One can extrapolate some common arguments from the discourse surrounding CCTV surveillance
and the right to privacy; those who are in favour of a comprehensive CCTV surveillance regime
tend to use arguments that  justify CCTV based derogations on the right to privacy in terms of
CCTV's use as an effective tool. A tool that perhaps may need more resources or development, but a
necessary one none the less. The issue at hand in these arguments is almost always the increase in
security and safety through a decrease in fear. 
This argument is often met with arguments regarding the lack of impact CCTV purportedly has on
crime  and  terror.  But  most  of  the  counter  CCTV  arguments  are  derived  from  the  fear  of  a
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surveillance “creep” and of the alternative uses for said surveillance. Even though it is not explicitly
mentioned in the media sampled in this paper, one of the major issues is that of trust, can the CCTV
operators be trusted?
4.3. Covert video surveillance of Arne Treholt.
Arne Treholt is  a former Bureau chief of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was
arrested by the Norwegian Police Security Service in January 1984 under suspicion of disclosing
national secrets to the Soviet Union. He was tried, convicted and served 9 years in prison before
being pardoned in 1992 (Kolsrud 2008). Treholt claims he is innocent and has made several appeals
to have his conviction overturned, all of which have been rejected. 
In 2010 the “Treholt-case” came into media focus yet again as a result of two new revelations. First;
claims were made that some of the evidence against Treholt was in fact falsified, and second; it was
revealed that Arne Treholt had been under covert surveillance for a year and a half, which included
covert video and audio surveillance of his private family residence, a security measure that was
illegal  under  Norwegian  law  at  the  time.  Understandably  this  caused  quite  an  outcry  in  the
Norwegian media although not solely due to issues of legality but also on grounds of principles
related to the right to privacy. The fact that unbeknownst to her Treholt's wife at the time, Kari
Storækre, and their son were by extension also under constant surveillance, was an important aspect
of the media coverage. Indeed it has been argued that Storækre and her son should have reparation
made to them, and some argue that Treholt should also be compensated. The debate is of interest to
this  thesis  as  it  illustrates  how the  right  to  privacy is  conceptualised  by  media  commentators
surrounding, and the actors involved in, an actual application of video surveillance. It is particularly
interesting to note that these privacy concerns are discussed as an independent question regardless
of Treholt's guilt or innocence.
4.4 Discourse analysis regarding covert video surveillance of Arne Treholt:
On  the  27th of  September  2010  the  Lund-commission,  a  commission  that  monitors  illegal
surveillance  of  Norwegians,  confirmed  that  Arne  Treholt  had  been  under  illegal  covert  video
surveillance for almost two years until his arrest in 1984. A fact that the commission had previously
withheld from the public and the various actors related to the case (Aalbu 2010).
“We could see when Treholt had a nap on the sofa, played with his son in the living room or when
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the couple had friends visiting2” A former POT surveillance operator describing the extent of the
surveillance  Jonnassen,  Staveland  and  Gjerde  2010).  In  fact  the  surveillance  was  much  more
invasive and comprehensive than initially revealed, with the Lund-Commission explaining that they
had received reports from the POT stating that there were several more cameras around the house,
including inside the bedroom (Gjerde 2011). 
There  is  an  overwhelming  consensus  amongst  the  media  and  commentators  that  the  covert
surveillance of Arne Treholt and his family was an objectionable action. The discourse rarely seems
to contest this assumption, instead there appears to be a split between those commentators who
discuss the covert surveillance in terms of the loss, or the abuse, or the violation of the right to
privacy, or a persons integrity on the one hand  (Giertsen 2010, Aune and Hessevik 2010, Døvik and
Granbo  2010),  and  those  who  focus  on  the  illegality  of  the  surveillance  on  the  other  hand
Jonnassen, Staveland and Gjerde 2010, NRK 2010 27/09, Stanghelle 2010).
While the difference may appear to be solely of the semantic kind, it may help shed some light on
the  conceptions  of  privacy  and  surveillance  that  are  dominant  in  the  discourse.  Those  who
contextualise the problematic as a question of rights, obviously see a clear violation of the Treholt
family's rights; with many commentators explicitly mentioning that despite any guilt on Treholt's
part, the surveillance was most certainly an unacceptable violation of the right to privacy (Giertsen
2010, Døvik and Granbo 2010). 
Treholt himself claims that, “This [the surveillance] is pure abuse which has nothing to do with
national security” (Aune and Hessevik 2010). The surveillance was solely an invasion of his private
sphere, where he and his wife were victims of a ”witch-hunt”.
The human rights specialist  Anine Kierulf, from the University of Oslo, referred to legal norms
when discussing the case in relation to the right of privacy. She pointed out in an interview with
NRK that the covert video surveillance of Kari Storækre is a clear violation of the EU Charter of
Fundamental  Rights  and  Norwegian  personal  integrity  laws,  concluding  that  Storækre  should
receive  some  form of  compensation  for  the  surveillance  (Døvik  and  Granbo  2010).  Similarly
Gierstsen (2010) also used legal  reasoning to question whether the Lund-commission, who had
withheld information about the surveillance from the actors since 1984, should be liable to Treholt
and his family.
2 All translations from Norwegian to English by the author of this paper.
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Several  commentators have questioned the Lund-commission over their  apparent willingness to
cover up illegal surveillance activities, these include the Justice Minister who asked why the Lund-
commission did not come forward with this information earlier, since they had already reported
illegal investigations which had been employed during the Treholt case (Aftenposten 2010).  The
Lund  commission  has  explained  their  omission  of  the  information,  by  pointing  out  that  their
mandate  and  focus  was  on  mapping  politically  motivated  registrations  and  surveillance  of
Norwegians by Norwegian authorities,  while counter-intelligence cases were in the “periphery”.
(NRK 2010 27/09)  This  could  imply that  since  the  surveillance  of  Treholt  fell  under  national
security, it is not afforded the same protection as politically motivated cases of illegal surveillance,
i.e. that national security trumps privacy in this case.
Admittedly there have been no explicit statements using such reasoning, but there does seem to be
such a mentality. According to a former POT employee who worked on the Treholt case; the POT
were willing to go as far as to falsify evidence to get Treholt convicted for treason, and the POT
leader in charge of the surveillance was reported to have said that there are “other rules in play for
POT” Jonnassen, Staveland and Gjerde 2010). 
Some newspaper commentators pointed out that there appears to have been a mental attitude that
POT operatives could get away with anything. This can possibly be observed in the fact that the
Lund-commission did not mention to  their  “employers”,  the Norwegian Parliament,  that  illegal
surveillance had been used (Stanghelle 2010). It could also be argued that it was simply a case of
“the ends justify the means” mentality applied to surveillance and privacy. 
In the general discourse the issue of trust is not explicitly mentioned by media or commentators but
it is certainly  implied  by the texts. Stanghelle (2010) is an exception and does mention that this
could lead to a sense of mistrust regarding PST, the modern version of the POT, and surveillance
regimes in general.  Interestingly the commentators appear to be unanimous in regarding covert
surveillance as objectionable. Some go as far as to argue that the silence of the Lund-commission
was in fact a violation of the right to privacy, even though Treholt and his family were no longer
under surveillance.  Treholt and his family could not take action in response to the surveillance
without being aware of  it  (Giertsen 2010).  This is  interesting as it  implies that  privacy has an
inherent value that is violated even when the observed are not conscious of the surveillance. 
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5:  Privacy and video surveillance:
5.1. The development of Privacy and Surveillance: 
In previous chapters the conception of the right to privacy has proven to be elusive, privacy does
not have a set definition, the meaning of the word changes, depending on cultural and historical
context. While the meaning changes, so does its effect on society, the way we conceptualise privacy
affects what is and what is not an acceptable intrusion on our solitude, life or interests. Privacy is an
inherently individual right,  it  entails  a certain  withdrawal from society;  the individual does  not
participate in society with the private aspects of their being, while the public society cannot enter
nor  intrude  in  these  aspects.  The  private  aspects  of  an  individual  can  be  defined  in  terms  of
information; at the most basic level we can reduce privacy to the control over an individual's own
personal data (Posner 2008, Rosen 2000, Ashworth and Free 2006). How much or how little of a
person’s data should be under this control, is of course less clear. The threat to privacy is in the
collection of data or surveillance. Surveillance and privacy are in an antagonistic contradiction, they
cannot co-exist. 
Out  of  the  threat  posed  by  surveillance  through  the  information  gathering  capabilities  of  the
photographic camera,  evolved  the original  conception of  privacy as  the right  “to  be  let  alone”
(Rosen 2000). As a definition of privacy it entails a certain control of personal information, but is
incapable of protecting personal data from modern technology. Many different conceptions have
since developed in order to face the threats posed by modern surveillance technology. It can be
argued that there are two broad types of modern conceptions of privacy; those that focus on the
inherent value of privacy to both the individual and society, (Rosen 2000, Introna and Pouloudi
1999) and those that focus on an individual’s agency to control their personal data in order to create
beneficial exchanges (Ashworth and Free 2006, Posner 2008).  
The conceptions that emphasise an inherent value of privacy, appear to focus on the protection of
privacy, that no matter what other benefits one can procure in exchange, the value of privacy is too
great to squander. These conceptions are inherently defensive and, it could be argued, a response to
evolving surveillance threats. As surveillance technology stretches to more fields of human life and
interaction, these privacy conceptions redefine themselves and throw up barriers in response. An
example could be an imagined response to the collection of data for a medical database. An inherent
value based approach to privacy would contend that such data must be properly regulated and the
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stakeholder,  that  is,  the  individual  involved,  must  be  protected  from  data  misuse  or
misappropriation (Introna and Pouloudi 1999).
Exchange based conceptions,  focus on how individuals can enjoy the freedom to disclose their
personal data unhindered in order to benefit from the exchange. They could be said to internalise
the threats  posed by modern informational  technology,  instead of  directly confronting them. In
response to the medical database situation above, an exchange conception of privacy might instead
advocate  an  active  participation  in  the  database,  after  judging  whether  the  exchange  is  free
(Ashworth and Free 2006).
There are of course more varied conceptions of the right  to privacy,  but these two provide the
optimal  starting  point  when  discussing  the  pertinent  values  and  concerns  while  discussing
surveillance as an aspect of security. 
5.2. Privacy and modern video surveillance as an aspect of security:
In today's  society, security is a major concern of policy makers,  citizens, academics and media
commentators  alike,  and  surveillance  is  a  major  aspect  of  modern  day  security  policies.
Surveillance is an integral tool in the policy maker’s arsenal in the “war on terror”, and is becoming
a more important tool as technology develops. As such, it is becoming increasingly important to
address  the  implications  of  security  surveillance  on  the  right  to  privacy.  As  one  of  the  more
controversial,  but valued aspects of surveillance (BBC 2006 20/07, 2011 20/01),  this paper has
chosen to focus on video surveillance. 
The  two  illustrative  examples  chosen;  CCTV  coverage  of  London  and  the  targeted  video
surveillance of Arne Treholt, are similar enough to enable us to compare the privacy concerns they
arouse, while still being different enough to provide a discussion with different perspectives. 
5.2.1: CCTV:
The  idea  of  a  voluntary  exchange,  is  a  basic  and  important  aspect  of  many  exchange-based
conceptions of privacy. Voluntary surveillance implies an active volition to undergo the surveillance
in question, something arguably lacking in London's CCTV network, in order to exchange ones
personal data for a good or benefit. CCTV coverage as comprehensive as the surveillance regime in
London, ensures that there is no plausible method of avoiding surveillance and still participating in
society at a normal level, therefore, as opposed to other types of surveillance, CCTV cannot be
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considered voluntary (Ashworth and Free 2006, Posner 2008). 
Of course one can argue that as a member of a democratic society, that one has implicitly accepted
that governments have the duty and authority to protect their citizen’s security and safety.  As a
member of society, one has made a Hobbesian social contract whereupon one accepts that the state
has the right to derogate from ones individual rights in order to protect the society. In effect: “the
public will be compensated for the costs of diminished privacy in increased security from terrorist
attacks” (Posner 2008: 251). This is of course a form of an exchange conception of privacy, except
that the agency has been removed from the individual and placed in the hands of the state or society.
Inherent in any exchange of privacy, is the concept of a fairness judgement. The exchange must be
considered a fair exchange from both a retributive and a procedural justice perspective (Ashworth
and Free 2006). The first involves a value judgement, the value of the good received, increased
security, must be equal or more to the value attributed to the loss of privacy, i.e. the data disclosed.
In regards to CCTV this is a controversial question; it is near impossible to definitely establish the
effectiveness  of  the  surveillance,  making  it  increasingly  hard  for  an  individual  to  make  a
satisfactory judgement. In addition, the data disclosed may be used for more than was originally
assumed, such as CCTV cameras being used against  dog foulers (BBC2009 06/02).  Procedural
judgement involves an individual feeling that they have been treated with respect in the exchange
(Ashworth and Free 2006). If the citizens of London do not feel they are treated with respect, such
as if they are not consulted prior to the re-purposing of CCTV cameras to track parking violations,
the exchange may no longer be fair to them.
From a purely inherent value based conception of privacy, CCTV is difficult to accommodate due to
the obvious violation of privacy, and the “chilling” effect that it has on human development and
interaction. The evaluation of CCTV would be based upon an evaluation of the intrusiveness; are
there still enough areas where one can as yet enjoy privacy? With the CCTV “creep” it is becoming
increasingly difficult to reconcile CCTV surveillance with an inherent value based conception of
privacy.
5.2.2: Covert video surveillance: 
One  major  difference  between  London's  CCTV  surveillance  regime,  and  the  covert  video
surveillance of Arne Treholt's house, is the scope. CCTV is a broad-based surveillance technique
capable of monitoring millions of people every day while the video surveillance used in Norway in
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the  1980s,  was  very  specific.  They  share  the  similarity  that  both  techniques  have  negative
externalities in the  targeting of people who are not yet suspects. 
An  analysis  of  the  media  surrounding  the  revelation  that  Treholt's  house  was  under  video
surveillance, shows that although the surveillance was condemned as objectionable, it may not have
been considered a violation of the right to privacy by all commentators. 
Obviously commentators who consider privacy to hold an inherent value, could not reconcile their
views with such an invasive surveillance. As opposed to CCTV, the video surveillance that Treholt
and Kari Storækre were under, showed an almost complete picture of their lives, especially when
coupled with the other forms of surveillance used at the time, Treholt was almost never outwith his
watchers sight (Jonnassen, Staveland and Gjerde 2010). The surveillance was particularly invasive
due to the fact that it was centred on his home, a concept from which the original conceptions of
privacy arose (Magi 2011). Proponents of privacy, as having an inherent value, would certainly
argue along with many of the commentators, that the issue of Treholt being guilty or innocent is
irrelevant, it was none the less a violation of his right to privacy (Gierstsen 2010, Døvik and Granbo
2010). 
Some commentators may perhaps argue that  in order to ensure national  security and safety for
Norwegian citizens,  it  may be necessary to derogate the right to privacy of certain individuals.
While one could support this approach from an exchange conception of privacy, it is hard to justify,
due  to  the  invasiveness  and  huge  consequences  for  innocent  bystanders.  A derogation  of  one
individual who has committed a crime, or is under strong suspicion, is much more easily accepted
in exchange for increased security for the other members of society (Posner 2008).
It  is interesting that many commentators appear to object  to this video surveillance,  not due to
concerns about privacy, as anti CCTV campaigners in the UK are known to do, but with concerns
about the legality of the action. There is certainly a much stronger acceptance of warrant based
surveillance, such as targeted wire taps, than broad-based surveillance, data mining of all telephone
communications for example,  among privacy campaigners (Vlcek 2008, Posner 2008). But it  is
difficult  to  reconcile  such  an  invasive  surveillance  operation  when  it  violates  the  privacy  of
innocents.  The  fact  that  it  was  an  illegal  surveillance  operation,  most  likely  ensures  that  any
proponent of an increased surveillance regime will have a more difficult time as a result of the lack
of trust in the security forces.
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5.3. Common challenges to privacy in video surveillance:
One concern raised against both of the video surveillance regimes, is the question of justification.
As surveillance is an inherent threat to privacy, any surveillance must be justified in order for it to
have a chance to be reconciled with the right to privacy. A surveillance regime must be necessary in
order  to  be  justified.  An unnecessary surveillance  regime is  simply a  violation  of  the  right  to
privacy. Both examples of video surveillance claim to be justified in terms of security and safety,
this can be reconciled relatively smoothly with an exchange-based conception of privacy. Of greater
concern is how effective the regime is. If, as some statistics portray it, the London CCTV regime is
expansive, intrusive and inefficient, then the regime will have an extremely hard time to reconcile
itself with any conception of privacy. 
Several  theorists  have pointed out the seeming contradiction that  we,  as  individuals in modern
society,  are  becoming increasingly open with our  personal  information,  as  can  be  seen  by the
proliferation  of  social  networking  sites  and  blogs,  while  simultaneously becoming increasingly
concerned with privacy (Rosen 2000, Posner 2008, Magi 2011). This can be reconciled through
trust, that one trusts that the data disclosed for a given purpose is solely used for that purpose. 
Trust is a necessity, if surveillance regimes are to be successfully implemented, an individual will
not disclose data without trust, an exchange will not be judged fair if it is not judged trustworthy,
and covert surveillance will not be reconciled with the general populace if they cannot trust the
surveillance  operators.  This  is  particularly  important  in  regards  to  security  surveillance.  If
individuals can trust the CCTV operators to keep all personal data secret, and only use the data
gathered for the stated purpose, they are less likely to be opposed, especially when they are aware
of the possible security that may be exchanged (Posner 2008, Haggerty and Gazso 2005). Covert
video surveillance can, if legal, be accepted under the same reasoning, if there is a trust in the
operators. Of course these kinds of surveillance regimes are controversial, simply pledging to keep
the  data  safe  and  to  use  it  for  its  original  purpose,  will  likely not  be  enough.  Increased  and




The right to privacy is a fundamental human right set forth in both the UDHR and the CCPR. In
order for it to be adequately protected as a right, human rights defenders must understand what the
right actually is. This paper set out to discuss and compare different conceptions of the right to
privacy, and how developments in technology and surveillance are challenging that right.
The events of 9/11 and the “war on terror” have ushered in an age where security is the predominant
concern  of  policy  makers  and  governments,  where  they  struggle  to  balance  the  apparently
antagonistic  values  of  security  and  civil  liberties,  among  which,  is  privacy  (Goldstone  2006).
Surveillance has become one of the favoured tools of policy makers in their counter-terror tactics,
and has grown as an aspect of society. As surveillance has become more prominent, so have the
threats it presents to privacy. 
The paper has discussed several different conceptions of privacy, and how the conception used can
alter the way we view our society, and our priorities, particularly in regards to surveillance. Privacy
is  not  a  constant  and  universal  principle,  but  changes  due  to  socio-cultural  and  historical
circumstances.  Even  today  the  conception  of  privacy  is  changing  in  response  to  recent
developments, in particular, technological developments. The innovations within communications,
prompted by the information age, have helped evolve the conception of the right to privacy further.
Any conceptions of the right to privacy can no longer be solely based upon property or the “right to
be let alone”. The various issues that concern privacy in modern society, mean that one can no
longer  give  privacy  a  single  definition,  but  must  instead  use  it  as  an  umbrella  phrase  that
encompasses the many varied aspects of the concept.
On the most basic level, privacy is simply the control of one's own personal data. The antithesis to
that is surveillance. Surveillance is, at its most simple level, the collection of personal data. As such,
surveillance is an antagonistic contradiction to privacy and the greatest threat to the right to privacy.
Surveillance is perhaps a necessary part of any definition of privacy, as privacy is shaped and often
defines the threats it faces. 
Among the various understandings of privacy, two were particularly beneficial to this paper; the
inherent value based conception, which focuses on how privacy has an inherent value, and is a goal
in itself,  and the exchange based conception, which portrays  privacy in  terms of  exchanges of
personal data for societal goods or benefits. 
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The original threat to privacy in Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren's article, was that of the
“instantaneous photographs” (quoted in Rosen 2000: 34). In today's security minded society one of
the greatest threats to privacy is that of video surveillance. This paper has analysed the discourses
surrounding CCTV usage in London, and the use of covert video surveillance on Arne Treholt in
Norway, in order to better understand how surveillance affects different conceptions of privacy and
vice versa. How video surveillance could be reconciled with various conceptions of privacy was
also investigated. 
Most of the discourses were variants of the two main conceptions of the right to privacy previously
described.  Surveillance  was  as  such,  difficult  to  reconcile  with  most  conceptions,  due  to  the
inherent  antagonistic  contradiction  between  the  two  concepts.  It  was  found  that  an  exchange
conception  of  privacy  could  be  reconciled  with  surveillance,  if  certain  conditions  were  met.
Specifically that the trade of personal data for societal goods is beneficial for the individual.
The  surveillance  has  to  be  justified;  individuals  in  society  must  be  able  to  make  a  fairness
judgement regarding their loss of privacy and what they receive in exchange. The surveillance has
to be efficient, it has to be a fair exchange of values, and the individual must be able to trust that
their personal data will not be misused or re-purposed. This is an increasing problem in modern
society, as more and more data is stored in electronic databases and left vulnerable to become a
“surveillant assemblage”. 
For a security surveillance regime to be able to attempt to reconcile itself with the right to privacy, it
must be able to guarantee that the data is not re-purposed, the surveillance operators must gain the
trust of the individuals. This is most simply done by clear and transparent regulation, ensuring that
data is used properly. If these conditions are met in an individual’s evaluation, then it is possible to
reconcile his/her privacy as an exchange for increased security through surveillance. In most cases
individuals and commentators have a conception of the right to privacy where derogations can be
made in exchange for security, but only to a certain extent, privacy does have inherent values.
It will never be possible to reconcile a surveillance regime that encroaches too far into our privacy,
but as the conception of privacy changes in response to outer circumstances,  it  may lead to an
eventual weakening of the right to privacy as our conceptions accept more and more derogations.
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6.1. Recommendations:
The paper has the following recommendations to make:
Surveillance has become an important part of modern society, almost an integral one, which we use
in trade, communication and security;  we cannot simply do away with it.  At the same time we
cannot allow it to run rampant and intrude more than necessary into our privacy. 
At this moment in history we are in a paradigm where security is the emphasis of policy, and fear is
on the minds of many. Eventually this mindset will pass and we will be left with a surveillance
regime that  is  no longer  necessary but  institutionally difficult  to  remove (Haggerty and Gozso
2005). In order to combat this we must be aware of the risks, and develop regulation that will both
minimise  the  amount  of  surveillance  used,  and  prevent  the  misappropriation  of  databases  into
surveillant assemblages. This regulation ought to be developed on an international level, perhaps in
the form of a treaty.  The retention and spread of data in databases,  which are constantly being
merged, may pose the greatest threat to the right to privacy in the coming years. Such regulation
could potentially increase individual's  trust  in surveillance operators and their ability to aid the
populace.
This paper recommends that further research be made into other aspects of surveillance, particularly
in  regards  to  data  aggregation  and  mining,  and  how  that  affects  the  right  to  privacy  and  its
protection. Another interesting direction for potential research could be investigating the efficiency
of CCTV coverage; it is still something of a mystery. 
On a final note, this paper opened with a quote from Benjamin Franklin reminding us that we do not
deserve liberty if we give it up for safety. This paper agrees in principle, although modern society
necessitates a certain loss of privacy. Instead we must remain vigilant to minimise the encroachment
into our privacy. The surveillance that is now part of our lives must be kept under scrutiny. In order
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